The Western Allies had limited intelligence assets in Central and Eastern Europe. The extensive in-place Polish intelligence network proved a major resource; between the French capitulation and other Allied networks that were undeveloped at the time, it was even described as "the only [A]llied intelligence assets on the Continent".{{cite journal|last=Schwonek|first=Matthew R.|date=2006-04-19|title=Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain during World War II: The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee, vol. 1 (review)|journal=The Journal of Military History|volume=70|issue=2 |pages=528–529 |s2cid=161747036 |issn=1543-7795 |doi=10.1353/jmh.2006.0128}}{{cite journal|last=Peszke|first=Michael Alfred|date=2006-12-01|title=A Review of: "Intelligence Co-Operation between Poland and Great Britain during World War II — The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee"|journal=The Journal of Slavic Military Studies|volume=19|issue=4 |pages=787–790|doi=10.1080/13518040601028578|s2cid=219626554 |issn=1351-8046}} According to {{ill|Marek Ney-Krwawicz|pl|Marek Ney-Krwawicz}}, for the Western Allies, the intelligence provided by the Home Army was considered to be the best source of information on the Eastern Front.{{sfnp|Ney-Krwawicz|2001|p=98}}

The Western Allies had limited intelligence assets in Central and Eastern Europe. The extensive in-place Polish intelligence network proved a major resource; between the French capitulation and other Allied networks that were undeveloped at the time, it was even described as "the only [A]llied intelligence assets on the Continent".{{cite journal|last=Schwonek|first=Matthew R.|date=2006-04-19|title=Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain during World War II: The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee, vol. 1 (review)|journal=The Journal of Military History|volume=70|issue=2 |pages=528–529 |s2cid=161747036 |issn=1543-7795 |doi=10.1353/jmh.2006.0128}}{{cite journal|last=Peszke|first=Michael Alfred|date=2006-12-01|title=A Review of: "Intelligence Co-Operation between Poland and Great Britain during World War II — The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee"|journal=The Journal of Slavic Military Studies|volume=19|issue=4 |pages=787–790|doi=10.1080/13518040601028578|s2cid=219626554 |issn=1351-8046}} According to {{ill|Marek Ney-Krwawicz|pl|Marek Ney-Krwawicz}}, for the Western Allies, the intelligence provided by the Home Army was considered to be the best source of information on the Eastern Front.{{sfnp|Ney-Krwawicz|2001|p=98}}

Home Army intelligence provided the Allies with information on [[German concentration camps]] and [[the Holocaust in Poland]] (including [[Karski's reports|the first reports]] on this subject received by the Allies{{sfnp|Zimmerman|2015|p=54}}{{Cite journal|last=Engel|first=David|date=1983|title=An Early Account of Polish Jewry under Nazi and Soviet Occupation Presented to the Polish Government-In-Exile, February 1940|journal=Jewish Social Studies|volume=45|issue=1|pages=1–16|issn=0021-6704|jstor=4467201}}), German submarine operations, and, most famously, [[Home Army and V1 and V2|the V-1 flying bomb and V-2 rocket]].{{sfnp|Ney-Krwawicz|2001|p=98}} In one [[Project Big Ben]] mission ([[Operation Most III|Operation Wildhorn III]]; Polish [[cryptonym]], ''Most III'', "Bridge III"), a stripped-for-lightness RAF twin-engine [[Douglas Dakota|Dakota]] flew from [[Brindisi]], [[Italy]], to an abandoned German airfield in Poland to pick up intelligence prepared by Polish aircraft-designer [[Antoni Kocjan]], including {{convert|100|lb|abbr=on}} of [[V-2 rocket]] wreckage from a [[Peenemünde]] launch, a ''Special Report 1/R, no. 242'', photographs, eight key V-2 parts, and drawings of the wreckage. Polish agents also provided reports on the German war production, morale, and troop movements. The Polish intelligence network extended beyond Poland and even beyond Europe: for example, the intelligence network organized by Mieczysław Zygfryd Słowikowski in North Africa has been described as "the only [A]llied ... network in North Africa". The Polish network even had two agents in the German high command itself.

Home Army intelligence provided the Allies with information on [[German concentration camps]] and [[the Holocaust in Poland]] (including [[Karski's reports|the first reports]] on this subject received by the Allies{{sfnp|Zimmerman|2015|p=54}}{{Cite journal|last=Engel|first=David|date=1983|title=An Early Account of Polish Jewry under Nazi and Soviet Occupation Presented to the Polish Government-In-Exile, February 1940|journal=Jewish Social Studies|volume=45|issue=1|pages=1–16|issn=0021-6704|jstor=4467201}}), German submarine operations, and, most famously, [[Home Army and V1 and V2|the V-1 flying bomb and V-2 rocket]].{{sfnp|Ney-Krwawicz|2001|p=98}} In one [[Project Big Ben]] mission ([[Operation Most III|Operation Wildhorn III]]; Polish [[cryptonym]], ''Most III'', "Bridge III"), a stripped-for-lightness RAF twin-engine [[Douglas Dakota|Dakota]] flew from [[Brindisi]], Italy, to an abandoned German airfield in Poland to pick up intelligence prepared by Polish aircraft-designer [[Antoni Kocjan]], including {{convert|100|lb|abbr=on}} of [[V-2 rocket]] wreckage from a [[Peenemünde]] launch, a ''Special Report 1/R, no. 242'', photographs, eight key V-2 parts, and drawings of the wreckage. Polish agents also provided reports on the German war production, morale, and troop movements. The Polish intelligence network extended beyond Poland and even beyond Europe: for example, the intelligence network organized by Mieczysław Zygfryd Słowikowski in North Africa has been described as "the only [A]llied ... network in North Africa". The Polish network even had two agents in the German high command itself.

The researchers who produced the first Polish–British in-depth monograph on Home Army intelligence (''Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee'', 2005) described contributions of Polish intelligence to the Allied victory as "disproportionally large"{{cite book|title=Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee |editor1=Tessa Stirling|editor2=Daria Nałęcz|editor3=Tadeusz Dubicki|publisher=Vallentine Mitchell|year=2005|isbn=978-0-85303-656-2|page=32|quote=This tendency influenced the unwillingness to recognize the disproportionally large contribution of Polish Intelligence to the Allied victory over Germany|author=Anglo-Polish Historical Committee}} and argued that "the work performed by Home Army intelligence undoubtedly supported the Allied armed effort much more effectively than subversive and guerilla activities".{{cite book|editor1=Tessa Stirling|editor2=Daria Nałęcz|editor3=Tadeusz Dubicki|author=Anglo-Polish Historical Committee|title=Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee|year=2005|publisher=Vallentine Mitchell|isbn=978-0-85303-656-2|page=410}}

The researchers who produced the first Polish–British in-depth monograph on Home Army intelligence (''Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee'', 2005) described contributions of Polish intelligence to the Allied victory as "disproportionally large"{{cite book|title=Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee |editor1=Tessa Stirling|editor2=Daria Nałęcz|editor3=Tadeusz Dubicki|publisher=Vallentine Mitchell|year=2005|isbn=978-0-85303-656-2|page=32|quote=This tendency influenced the unwillingness to recognize the disproportionally large contribution of Polish Intelligence to the Allied victory over Germany|author=Anglo-Polish Historical Committee}} and argued that "the work performed by Home Army intelligence undoubtedly supported the Allied armed effort much more effectively than subversive and guerilla activities".{{cite book|editor1=Tessa Stirling|editor2=Daria Nałęcz|editor3=Tadeusz Dubicki|author=Anglo-Polish Historical Committee|title=Intelligence Co-operation Between Poland and Great Britain During World War II: Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee|year=2005|publisher=Vallentine Mitchell|isbn=978-0-85303-656-2|page=410}}

{{See also|Cursed soldiers}}

{{See also|Cursed soldiers}}

[[File:Moscow Trial 1945.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|June 1945 [[Moscow]] [[Trial of the Sixteen|show trial of 16 Polish civil and Home Army leaders]]. They were convicted of "planning military action against the U.S.S.R." In March 1945 they had been invited to help organize a Polish Government of National Unity and were arrested by the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] [[NKVD]]. Despite the court's lenience, 6 years later only two of the men were alive.]]

[[File:Moscow Trial 1945.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|June 1945 [[Moscow]] [[Trial of the Sixteen|show trial of 16 Polish civil and Home Army leaders]]. They were convicted of "planning military action against the U.S.S.R." In March 1945 they had been invited to help organize a Polish Government of National Unity and were arrested by the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] [[NKVD]]. Despite the court's lenience, 6 years later only two of the men were alive.]]

The Home Army was officially disbanded on 19 January 1945 to avoid civil war and armed conflict with the Soviets. However, many former Home Army units decided to continue operations. The Soviet Union, and the [[Provisional Government of National Unity|Polish communist government]] that it controlled, viewed the underground, still loyal to the Polish government-in-exile, as a force to be extirpated before they could gain complete control of Poland. Future [[Secretary General]] of the [[Polish United Workers' Party]], [[Władysław Gomułka]], is quoted as saying: "Soldiers of the AK are a hostile element which must be removed without mercy." Another prominent Polish communist, [[Roman Zambrowski]], said that the Home Army had to be "exterminated."{{Better source needed|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}

The Home Army was officially disbanded on 19 January 1945 to avoid civil war and armed conflict with the Soviets. However, many former Home Army units decided to continue operations. The Soviet Union, and the [[Provisional Government of National Unity|Polish communist government]] that it controlled, viewed the underground, still loyal to the Polish government-in-exile, as a force to be extirpated before they could gain complete control of Poland. Future [[Secretary General]] of the [[Polish United Workers' Party]], [[Władysław Gomułka]], is quoted as saying: "Soldiers of the AK are a hostile element which must be removed without mercy." Another prominent Polish communist, [[Roman Zambrowski]], said that the Home Army had to be "exterminated".{{Better source needed|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}

The first Home Army structure designed primarily to deal with the Soviet threat had been [[NIE (resistance)|NIE]], formed in mid-1943. Its aim was not to engage Soviet forces in combat, but to observe them and to gather intelligence while the Polish Government-in-Exile decided how to deal with the Soviets; at that time, the exiled government still believed in the possibility of constructive negotiations with the Soviets. On 7 May 1945 NIE was disbanded and transformed into the [[Armed Forces Delegation for Poland]] (''Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych na Kraj''), but it was disbanded on 8 August 1945 to stop partisan resistance.{{Better source needed|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}

The first Home Army structure designed primarily to deal with the Soviet threat had been [[NIE (resistance)|NIE]], formed in mid-1943. Its aim was not to engage Soviet forces in combat, but to observe them and to gather intelligence while the Polish Government-in-Exile decided how to deal with the Soviets; at that time, the exiled government still believed in the possibility of constructive negotiations with the Soviets. On 7 May 1945 NIE was disbanded and transformed into the [[Armed Forces Delegation for Poland]] (''Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych na Kraj''), but it was disbanded on 8 August 1945 to stop partisan resistance.{{Better source needed|reason=not scholarly / not English|date=November 2019}}